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IDEOLOGY OR ISOLATIONISM'? RUSSIAN IDENTITY AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON ORTHODOX-CATHOLIC RELATIONS

by Catherine Clare Caridi

Catherine Clare Caridi (Roman Catholic) has graduate degrees in both Canon Law
and Russian Studies (M.A., Georgetown
University). She practices law and teaches in Northern Virginia. lier regular column
on canonical q ue sti ons can be read online at Catholic Exchange
(www.catholicexchange.com).
(J.C.L., Catholic University of America)

PART II: RUSSIAN IDENTITY AND ROMAN CATHOLICISM
In t rodu ct ion

We saw in Patt I of this article (Vol. XXH, No. I, Febmary 2007) that the Ru ss ia n
Orthodox hierarchy are anything but enthusiastic about the modem conc ept of religious

fr eed om

as commonly enshrined in the laws of Western c ount r es.
i

Thei r unwi ll ingness to

embrace this concept stems in great part from the historical conn ec tion in Russia between the
Russian identit y

and

the Russian Orthodox Church. If being a R ussian

means that one

Ortl1odox, how can one justifY the existence in Russia of other, no n-Otthodox
churches? More im po rtan tl y, how can

is

Christian

a R ussia n in good con scienc e sit i dly by while non-

0Ithodox ev an ge lizer s entice native Ru ssi an s

to

become members of these churches? It is

this attitude toward non-Orthodox believers that h as led the Ru ssi an Otthodox hierarchy in
recent years

to

lobby active ly for the passage of laws prot ec ting

that historically it is the one, traditional faith

of

Orthodo xy,

by recognizing

the Russian people. While other Christian

churches have in fact been op emtin g on Russian soil for gen erat ion s, Orthodox leaders assert

that their presence in Russia was permitted solely in order that they might mi ni ster to their
et hnica ll y non-Russian members liv in g within Russia .

We also saw that the religious freedoms permitted in post-communist Russia brought
with them an influx of foreign
of the

C hr s tian
i

missionaries, who ac tivel y s o ught to convett citizens

new Russia, who had grown up in officially atheist Soviet so ciety. Since these new

convett� to non-Orthodox faiths are la rge l y ethnic Russians, the Russian Orthodox Church
protests that they arc b eing pulled awa y from the Church of which they arc

n atu ral

members

by reason of their ethnicity.
In P art

II, I will

focus on the activity of the C at ho lic Church, both historically

currently, on Russian soil.

and

The general concerns of Russian Orthodox leaders about
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proselytizing among Russian citizens can
than amicable auirude toward

be seen to

be particularly applicable in their less

Cat holicis m, which is

num er ically the

largest branc h

of

Catholic Church

immedia tely afteo·

C hri stiani ty and one t hat exists worl dwi de.

The

section

first

will discuss steps taken by the

the downfall of communism

in the

still liv ing in its territories and to
r ep ressi ons of the

Soviet

Union, in order to

find etlicie nt ways

communi st p a st had

assess the number of Catholics

to minister to them. Since t he religious

oflicially end ed

,

Cathol ic l eader s sought to regula rize

t he org aniza tion of their activities on Russi an land in accord wi t h Catholic canon law. Given
the Orthodox

Church

not be suovris ing
from

'

s traditional correlation of one's rel i gion

that the

actions

the Orthodox l eader ship
In

the

of the Catholic hierarchy in

with one's ethnici ty, it should

this regard dre w

swift protests

.

second section, I

will

discuss the ecclesiol ogical attitudes of Catholicism,

which do es not identity itself with any

pao1icular

racial, ethnic or other grouping, and thus

considers its activiti es to b e quit e apart from any terr i torial boundaries drawn
political powers.

The ideological contrast

La stl y, I will

examine the specific argument

made by Russian Orthodox leaders, that

territory

of

the Russian

This is a c harge that Catholic leaders have strenuously denied, citing the

Orthodox Church.

Church's

o wn teachi ngs

again st

this very

ac tivity

It

.

will

be shown

argument stems in great part fi·om a disagreement a bou t the definition of
"

pro sel yti sm

"

itself-a disagreement which

in

tum

stems

from

ecclesiological notions embraced by Or thodoxy and Catholicism, and
solved merely by

diplomatic nego tia tions and

one

very

that

the

the term
different

which cannot

be

th eol ogy

finn statistics on this point are

availa ble) that the Orthodox hierarchy's concem may be grounded in

Russians are, since the

the

compromi se, founde d as it is on the

guiding each Church. Meanwhile, it appears (alth oug h no

ethnic

secular

with Or tho doxy should be evident

the Catholic Church is engaged in proselytism within t he canonical

Catholic

by

the fact that numbers of

downfall of the Soviet Union, regularly joining the C at holic

Church.

I.

The

Impact of Russia's Current Religious Freedom Law

on the Catholic Church

in

Russia

W it h t he breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 a nd the relaxation of the hars h
restr icti ons impos ed

by

the coun try s fonner
'

co mmunist leaders, the Roman Catholic Church
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immediately took steps to assess the damage done to Catholic institutions in Russia during
the preceding 70 years, and to arrange to minister in an open and more stable way to those
Catholics still living in Russia.

For these purposes the Apostolic See established two

Apostolic Administrations in Russia in 1991. Eight years later, they were re-divided into four.
Under Catholic canon law, an apostolic administration is like a diocese, which is a
portion of territory placed under the spiritual care and authority of a bishop (canon 368). The
Pope can choose to set up an apostolic administration rather than a diocese in situations
where special and serious reasons exist (usually political) that might hinder the stability of the
operations of a regular diocese (canon 371.2).

If, for example, a nation's borders are not

settled, or if a e
s cular govenunent in some way is regularly hindering the routine operations
of the Catholic Church, it may not be feasible for Rome to establish a diocese(s) with set
territorial boundaries within that particular country.

Should the situation subsequently

become more settled, canon law dictates that an apostolic administration be converted to a
diocese, with pennanenl borders and greater stability.
Given. the political and social upheaval taking place in the various parts of the former
Soviet Union in 1991, with various nations rapidly (but not always predictably!) declaring
themselves independent, it was logical for the Apostolic See initially to divide the tenit01y of
Russia into several administrative parts without yet establishing dioceses, so as 10 enable the
church to begin to re-form itself in Russia before making any pennanent decisions concerning
Catholic administration there.
And re-formation of pre-existing Catholic institutions in Russia was desperately
needed. Many are unaware of the significant number of Catholics who continue to live in
Russia even after two generations of communist persecution seemed close to eliminating
Catholicism from the country entirely.
around

500,000

Catholics in Russia.

According to official Catholic statistics, there arc

"

This number, together with the Vatican's projection

regarding future growth of the church, points to an additional three million people for whom
a conversion to Catholicism would represent a retunl to the faith of their forefathers."'

As

seen in Part I of this article, the Catholic Church had been operating in imperial Russia
already for generations before the communist revolution of 1917.

Its prima1y reason for

existence in a country officially designated as Orthodox had been to minister to those
Catholic foreigners, primarily Poles, who lived within Russia's borders.
1

filatov and Vorontsova, p.

I 03. A footnote in the original text notes thai "the authors cstimmc the ligurc

to be closer to 150,000. but that is sti ll a significant number for a church jusl recovering from oppression."
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Yet this does not mean that all Catholics living in Russia were or arc ethnically non
Russian.

Catholic Poles, Germans, or Lithuanians living in imperial Russia naturally

intermmTied, leading at times to the conversion of Russian spouses and/or the raising of
Catholic children with Russian blood. And with the 1905 Edict of Toleration granting some
measure

of religious

freedom,

Orthodox

Russians

were

legally free

to

convert

to

Catholicism-and, as noted in Part l, many did precisely that. This has led to an interesting
contemporary mixture of ethnicities and religions. Shchipkov notes that currently "the
majority of Catholics in Central Russia are Germans and Poles, though ethnic Russians
comprise up to 40 percent.

In some Siberian regions like Irkutsk, though, Catholic parishes

are almost entirely made up of Russians.

... Catholicism in Russia has tended to become

russifted, and not just as a result of proselytism [a tact which] both delights and appalls the
leadership of the Apostolic Administration, which is striving to preserve a good relationship
with the Moscow Patriarchate."2
Maintaining a good relationship with the Orthodox leadership has indeed proven an
arduous task for members of the Catholic hierarchy in Russia. Virtually from the moment
that the Catholic Church began to restore its operations in Russia in 1991, Orthodox leaders
have accused it of setting up, in the words of Patriarch Alexei, "parallel canonical structures"
which overlap with and reduplicate those of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Alexei's

objection stems

from

the

notion, already

discussed,

that

Russia is

historically an Orthodox country, already organized into dioceses which are subdivided into
parishes.

As such it has no place for Catholic apostolic administrations and the building of

Catholic parish churches.

The Patriarch contends that the work of the Catholic Church in

Russia since the breakup of the Soviet Union constitutes proselytism.
And his contentions grew even more heated when, in 2002, the Vatican changed the
status o f those Russian apostolic administrations into dioceses, and officially assigned a
bisho1> to each.

Again, this move was in accord with Catholic canon law.

The political

situation in the fonner Soviet Union had been stabilized, and it became clear that the country
of Russia had essentially settled its borders and established a more or less stable government
No longer viewed as a totalitarian pariah, Russia was on its way to becoming a

system.

respected player in international affairs.

The uncertainty of the future, which had led the

Pope to create apostolic administrations in Russia rather than dioceses back in 19 91, had been

1

Shchipkov, in Witte, pp. 81 and 91.
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replaced by a sufficiently co nsisten t state of political affairs, and this led the Vatican to
change the legal status of its administrative divisions in Russia.
The move was a matter of procedural canon law. for Catholics, it had no particular
theolog ical import. few, if any, on the ground would see any visible changes in the daily

operations of the Catholic Church in the Russian Federation.
As

a

courtesy, Vatican

•·ep resen tati ves

in

Moscow informed the Orthodox

Patriarchate there of this impending change several days in advance. The Vatican had also
taken steps to avoid any appearance of creating parallel canonical structures by deliberately

avoiding giving the new dioceses names that would be identical to Russian Orthodox ones.
Rather than naming the dioceses after the cities where the bishops' cathedrals are located, as

is (ypical, they were named instead after the cathedrals themselves.

For example, the

Cat holic archdiocese which has its bishop in Moscow is not called the Archdiocese of

Moscow, as would be expected, but rather the Archdiocese of the Mother of God, located at
Moscow. The Catholic cathedral church in Moscow is named after the Mother of God. The
other three dioceses were officially named the Diocese of St. Clement at Saratov, the Diocese

of the Transfig ur ation at Novosibirsk, and the Diocese of St. Jos eph at IrkutSk.
With this diplomatic gesture, the Pope sought to avoid any appearance that he
intended to set up administrative stmctures that would be competing with those of the
Russian Orthodox Church.

As Jesuit Father Jozef Maj, of the Pontifical Council for

Promoting Christian Unity, later wrote in the Vatican's newspaper, "one might have hoped
that in this procedure one might recognize not just an act of courtesy but the deep sensitivity

which must define relations between the Chw·cbes."3
But the Moscow Patriarchate thought differently. After the dioceses were officially
erected, an upcoming official meeting in Moscow with Cardinal Walter Kasper, head of the
above-mentioned Pont ifical Commission for Promotin g Ch ristian Unity and the Cat hol ic

counterpmt to the Orthodox Church's Kirill, was abmp tl y cancelled. Patriarch Alexei had
broken off ecumenical relations with the Catholic Church.

Reper cuss ions were quickly felt elsewhere as well. The Polish-born bishop of the
new diocese in Ir k utsk, Jerzy Mazur, had been operating in Russia on a one-year visa, with a

pending request for permanent Russian residency as a prelude to Russian citizenship.
3

"Relations of the J>an·iarchate of Moscow with the Holy See," I'Ossenotore Rom(mo, English edition,

February 29, 2003, p. 8. While this newspaper is not technically designated as the Vatican�s oflicial mouthpiece, it

is tacitly acknowledged that dte statements it contains do in fact accurately reflect theofficial1>osition ofthe Vatican.
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A rrivin g back in Russia after a trip abroad within days of his diocese's o fficia l establishment,
he was suddenly informed in the airport that his visa had been cancelled, and was promptly
ushered back out of the country . Despite protests by t he Vatican to the Russ ian government,
Bishop Mazur never received a new visa and thus was unable

to

re-enter Russia.

After

months of operating his four million-square-mile diocese via telephone from Poland, Bishop
Mazur was finally replaced by a new b is hop who is a cit izen of Russia, and Mazur himself
was made the bishop of another diocese, in Poland. While never publicly acknowledged as
such, it was and remains clear to all involved that the

Russian

govemment had acted at the

urging of the Moscow Patriarchate, as a retaliatory gesture in respon se to the creation of the

four dioceses in February 2002.
Cardinal K aspe r has, in fact, subsequently

visited Russian Orthodox officials,

including Patriarch Alexei himself, most notably in 2004 in order to rerum the Icon of Our
Lady of Kazan, which will be discussed at length in Part Ill of this article. But for two years,
Alexei refused to have any official, high-ranking contact with the Catholic

Church, in

continued protest of what he tenned its viola tion of Orthodox "canonical territory," in order
to proselytize among Orthodox Russians-a charge strenuously denied by Catholics.

II. Theology Underlying the Actions of the Catholic Church in Russia

The term "Catholic" in itse lf means "universal," and the Catholic Church exists in
virtually every country on earth. While there have been countries throughout history whose
political leaders have declared Catholicism to be the official re ligion of th e state, Catholicism
does not identify itself with any particular country or nationality.

Its goal is uni ty under a

central a utho rity, the Pope, who is traditionally also the Bishop of the diocese of Rome.

One can immediately see a difference between the Catholic world outlook and that of
Orthodoxy. As Schlafly puts it, "Rome always has had a strong missionary tradition... A key
element in Cath olic e vangeliza tion is centralized direction by the papacy," whereas in
contrast, "The theology and practice of the Russian Orthodox Church have been quite
different.

Rejecting, likes its sister Orthodox churches, the concept of a vis ib le juridical

center, it looks instead to a community of faith and tradition uniting local bis hops and their
flocks.'"

The h isto ric al Orthodox notion of symphonia, the balancing of a spiritual authority

and a secular wier within a nation, has never been embraced by the Catholic Church, which

'Schlally, p. 682.
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as a rule defines its local churches in territorial, not ethnic or national, tenns.

When

ministering in countries where Catholics are in the minority, the Catholic Church makes no
distinctions concerning their ethnicity or that of the non-Catholics living in the same region.
Consistent with its "centralized direction" as described by Schlafly above, the
Catholic Church tends to articulate its theological positions in a public and formal manner, so
it is possible to find its positions on various issues in its official documents.

And the

Church's authoritative teaching on ecumenical affairs was addressed directly during the
Second Vatican Council, in its November 21, 1964,

Decree on Ecumenism, Unita lis

Redintegratio. Its general attitude toward non-Catholic Christians is clearly stated:
For men who believe in Christ and have been properly baptized are put in
some, though imperfect, communion with the Catholic Church. ...But ...it
remains true that all who have been justified by faith in baptism are
incorporated into Christ; they therefore have a right to be called Christians,

and with good reason are accepted as brothers by the children of the Catholic
Church'
The same document dealt specifically with the issue of relations between Catholicism and
Orthodoxy.

It should be clear that the Catholic Church officially does not seek the

conversion of Orthodox believers to Catholicism:
This holy Synod solemnly declares that the Churches of the East, while
keeping in mind the necessary unity of the whole Church, have the power to
govern themselves according to their own disciplines, since these arc bcucr
suited to the character of their faithful and better adapted to foster the good
of souls. The perfect observance of this traditional principle-which indeed
has not always been observed-is a prerequisite for any restoration of union.6
Catholic teaching on matters relevant to Russian Orthodoxy is not always so devoid
of controversy.

The Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Religious Liberty (December

7, 1965) conflicts directly with the Social Concept document of the Russian Orthodox Church
on the issue of religious freedom.
It is through his conscience that man sees and recognizes the demands of the

divine law. He is bound to follow this conscience faithfully in all his activity

so that he may come to God, Who is his last end. Therefore he must not be
forced to act contrary to his conscience.

Nor must he be prevented from

acting according to his conscience, especially in religious matters .... to deny

.$

Unitatis Redimegralio. paragraph 3. English translations ofrhis and all other Vatican H documc1HS are

from Flannery, O.P.,Austin. ed., Vatican CouncilII: The Conciliar and Pos1 ConciliarDocumems (Northport, NY:
Costello Publishing Co., 1988).
' Ibid., paragraph t 6.
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man the free exercise of religion in society, when the just requirements of
public order arc observed, is to do an injustice to the human person....'
It should be clear that the Catholic Church's position on freedom of conscience dovetails with
that enshrined in Russian law in the early days following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
When Pope John Paul II protested to President Ycltsin about proposed restrictions to Russia's
laws on religious freedom, he was not simply acting according to self-interest.

His position

accurately reflected the teachings of Cad1olicism on the subject.
If the Catholic Church asserts that all should have freedom to seek the true faith, how
does that affect its position on missionmy activity in lands whose inhabitants already follow
other Christian, but non-Catholic beliefs?

Vatican Il's Decree on the Church's Missionary

Activity was issued on the same day as the Declaration on Religious Liberty, and makes it
clear that its definition of"mission" dcftnitely docs not pertain to other baptized Christians:
The special undertakings in which preachers of the Gospel, sent by the
Church, and going into the whole world, cany out the work of preaching the
Gospel and implanting the Church among people who do not yet believe in
Christ, are generally called "missions." ...a tremendous missionary work still
remains to be done.

There are two billion people-and their number is

increasing day by day-who have never, or barely, heard the Gospel
8

message....

It is evident that such a description of missionary activity could never be applied to Orthodox
believers, who have been baptized and who practice a Christian faith. There is no way that
such official Catholic teachings can reasonably be construed to permit, let alone encourage,
its members to attempt to pull Russian Orthodox Christians away from their faid1 and into the
Catholic Church.
Catholic missionary activity is also addressed in the official Catechism of the
Catholic Church, published in 1994. While the Catechism postdates the Council documents
cited above by three decades, it is clear that there has been no shift in the Catholic Church's
position: "the missionary task implies a respecifitl dialogue with those who do not yet accept
the Gospel. Believers... proclaim the Good News to those who do not know it...'"'
When applied to the Catholic Church's activity in Russia, we can perhaps get a better
idea of precisely how Russian Catholic leaders are to view their role. They minister to those
who were already Catholic long before the breakup of the Soviet Union permitted them to

1

Declaration on Reli gious Liberty Dignitatis llumanae. pnrngraph 3.
11 Dec.ree Ot'l the Church's Missionary Activity Ad GenJes Divinitus, paragraphs S & 10.
., r)aragraph 856 (emphasis in original).
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practice their

faith

freely and openly.

They welcome anyone who, professing no faith,

expresses interest in Catholicism.
One mi ght expect that they

also welcome

any Orthodox believers who sincerely wish

to become Catholics. Surprisingly, perhaps, this is not the case. As

Catholic Archbishop

Tadeusz Kondrusiewicz in Moscow stated publicly, "I always repeat, that for me Russia was,
is, and will remain a n Orthodox land. In Russia... conversion from 01thodoxy to Catholicism
is a rare occurrence. And 1 ant against such conversions."10
This is not simply the persona l opin io n

of

the Archbishop. In 1992 the Vatican's

Pontifical Commission for Russia published its principles and norms for evangelization in the
territories of the fonner Soviet Union. The Comm iss io n
respect for religious freedom,

priests

will

take

care

which

is

an inalienable right of every person, bishops and

to consider attentively the motives of

Catholic Church. Such people must also be made a wa re
comm un i ty

unequivocally that "in full

stated

those

of their

who ask

to

enter

the

obligations toward their own

of origin" (1, 3).'' Church hierarchs operating in these territories are to "take care

to ensure that no activity undertaken within their ecclesiastical circ um scrip tions can be easily
misconstrued

as

a 'parallel

structure of

evangelization"' (II, 2), which could be perceived as

competing with ex isting Orthodox stnicttires in the same territOiy.
Once again, this position is not merely an examp le
accurately reflects the teachings of

the Catholic

of V atican

diplomacy.

It

Church concerning ecumenical relations with

other Christians, and conceming missionary activity.

III. The Question of

P rosely tism and of Definition of the Term

During the roughly two years that Patriarch Alexei refused
leaders, his official position was that the

Catholic

to

meet with Catholic

Church must first cease to proselytize

among the Russian people. Members of the Catholic hierarchy, in response, insisted that no
proselytizing was taking place, and that Catholic institutions operating in Russia were
ministering to tbe spiritual needs

of

thos e Russians who were already Catholic. While they

welcomed any interested persons of no faith at all�f whom there

are

many in Russia today,

after 70 yeai'S of official atheism-Catholics were not actively seeking to conve11 01thodox
believers.

Moscow's Catholic

Ar chbis hop

Kondmsiewicz repeatedly requested that the

"Quoted in Schtatly, p. 688.

11 "Genernl
Pl'illciples and Practical Norms for Coordinating the Evangelizi ng Ac.tivity and Ecumenical

Commitmellt of the Catholic Church in Russia aod in the Other Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent
S1a1es." English trnnslaiion published in Origins 22117 (OcL 8, 1992): 301·304.
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Moscow Patriarchate provide specific examples of this alleged proselytism, so that they could
be addressed and corrected where necessary.
On June 25, 2002, Patriarch Alexei released a document in which he provided details
in support of his allegations, and addressed the repeated denials of Catholic officials that they
were engaging in proselytis m .
The problem of proselytism is aggravated b y the fact that the Catholic side denies tlatly its
very existence, referring to its own interpretation of the term 'proselytism' as enticement of
people from one Christian community to another through 'dishonest' means (for instance,
bribery). At the same time, it alludes to the preaching of the Gospel to 'non-believers and
non-baptized' people who come to Catholic churches exercising their freedom to choose a
religion that suits them. ...Catholics reject the veoy notion of caoonical territory.. . Catholic
clergy ... come to a country with a millennium-old Christian culture imbued with the
Orthodox tradition ....it has been evident for a long time that the object of the Catholic
mission in Russia and other CIS countries is the traditionally Orthodox population ... they
cannot be called non-believers or atheists to a man ...."
It is evident that the Patriarch is not so much focusing on the Catholic Church's
ministering in the former Soviet Union to those who were already Catholic. Rather, his chief
concern is that other Russians, who may have been raised with no faith during the communist
period, are joining the Catholic Church. And as has been seen above, this conflicts with the
Orthodox notion that those who arc ethnically Russian are supposed to be Orthodox
believers, as Orthodoxy is pan ofthe Russian identity .
Cardinal Kasper had, several months previously, published an essay in the Italian
Jesuit joumal Civilta Callolica." pondering the current state of relations with Moscow.
There he also addressed the notion of proselytism, pointing out that the Catholic ChUI'ch itself
is also currently dealing with "new sects" which are evangelizing among traditionally
Catholic people in Latin America, adding, "unlike the sects, all the so-called historic
Churches are agreed in their rejection of proselytism, understood in its original sense: they
are unanimous in their claim that it is wrong

to

work for the Gospel by illicit means . .. .

Because the Catholic Church recognizes the Orthodox Churches as true Churches and their
sacraments as true sacraments . .. it is entirely inappropriate to undertake missionary activity
among the Orthodox faithful ."
"
Clearly Kasper is here discussing the notion of proselytism using a definition that is
much narrower than that of Alexei. When Kasper and other Catholic leaders insist that the
"

English translation ao www.katolsk.no/nyheoct/2002107/08-000I .htm.

'' Civil!il Cauo/ica, 2002

1: 531-541 (March 16, 2002).

'" lbid. (This and the quotation on the following page are my ln:tnshltions).
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Church is not engaging in proselytism in Russia, they mean that there is no attempt being
made actively to convert Orthodox Russians away from Orthodoxy.

Receiving into the

Catho lic faith those Russians who either profess a non-Christian faith or no faith at all,
however, is not considered to be p roselytism.

Such persons are always welcome in the

Catholic Church, which, as noted earlier, perceives its mission to bring all souls to Christ as
over and above any tetTtorial limitations.
i

We can see here a fundamental disagreement over the correct usage of the term
"proselytism," that is gro unded in two very different ecclesiolog ical frameworks.

The

Moscow Patriarch holds that any Russian who is not Christian should be converted, but
converted to Orthodoxy, the historical religion of Russia. Catholicism, in contrast, makes no
distinctions as to an individual's ethnic or national iden tity, seeking to br ng any and all
i

persons to Christianity.

Thus Orthodox officials are able to provide evidence that Catholics

are proselytizing in Russia, according to the Orthodox definition of the term; while Catholics
are

equally

able to

deny that

they engage

in proselytism,

according to

their

own

understand ing of what the word means.
A question might here be raised: if the Russian Orthodox Church desires all Russian
non-believers to embrace Orthodoxy, why are Russians converting, in numbers that are
ap parently significant enoug h to alarm the Moscow Patriarchate, to Catholicism rather than to
Orthod oxy?
In his essay, Cardinal Kasper raised the possibility that "the Orthodox Church is
consci ous of its own pastoral and evangelizing weakness , and therefore fears a Catholic
presence that is basically more effective at the pastoral level, even if it is small numerically."
Alexei responded directly to this suggesti on in his July document, noting that
one can state confidently enough that the successes of the Catholics in Russia
have been indirectly conditioned by the influence of Orthodoxy on the life of
the Russians .... It is this predisposition of our people, who were wearied with
longing for faith during years of state atheism, rather than the effectiveness
of the Catholic 'pastoral level' in Russia, that accounts for the relative
success of not only Catho lic, but any preaching of Christ.';
Metrop olitan Kirill had, some years earlier, given an indication of the way the Russian
Orthodox Church leadership had expected other Christians to react to the downfall of
communism in the Soviet Union. lnstead of entering the territoty to evangelize it themselves,

15 Sec

note 61.
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they should have proffered assistance

to

the Orthodox, so that they could have re

Christianized Russia on their own:
We expected that with the coming of religious freedom ... other Christians
would support us in a new, no less difficult situation, ffi the Russian
Orthodox Church suddenly found itself before a door wide open to the
broadest possible religious freedom and a huge field for missionary work.
We sincerely hoped that we would be supported in this task. Our hopes,
however, were not fulfilled'•
Are huge numbers of Russians becoming Catholics, because of the presence now of Catholic
institutions throughout the country? Obtaining accurate statistics on genuine conversions is
hampered by

the

fact that there are Russians enter ng the Catholic Church now whose
i

families had already been

C atholics

in the

imperial era.

It could be argued that such persons

are not actually con vening to Catholicism, but are returning to the faith which the y would
have been practicing all along, had communist persecut on not hindered Catholic parishes
i

from operating freely.
Additionally

,

however, scholars Filatov and Vorontsova observe that there is

currently a sort of intellectual movement among some of the Russian intelligentsia, that is
leading many of them

to

embrace Catholicism irrespective of the increased visibility of

Catholic charitable institutions on Russian soil:
The increased participation in contemporary Russian Catholicism cannot be
explained in terms of the missionary activity of the church, for it is
negligible. Rather, ... there is a natural, spontaneous attraction w Cmholicism
among certain sections of Russian society. ... the majority of parishioners are
young, mainly students and members of the intelligentsia. ... The generally
high level of education among the parishioners ... gives Catholicism greater
influence and appeal. ... Catholics are, as a rule, well-educated with a Western
outlook; for many of them the concepts of culture and freedom are linked
primarily with the Catholic Church. "
It appears that there is more here at work than simply the efforts (alleged or real) of Catholics
in Russia to attract Russians to the Church.
restrictions imposed in

1997

Given that Russian law-even with the

at the urging of the Orthodox leadership-permits Russians to

embrace any or no faith in accord with the dictates of conscience, there will evidently be
some conversions to Catholicism among educated Russians regardless of whether or not
proselytizing is truly taking place.

•• Kirill,

'·Gospel and Culture," p. 73.

"filatov and Vorontsova, p.

104.

RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXVII, 2 (May 2007)

page 12

